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Brian Pinto and Sergei Ulatov
The Russian crisis of 1998 is yet another instance of financial
globalization contributing to an emerging market crisis in-
stead of better resource allocation and faster growth. Exter-
nal financial liberalization took place in the presence of weak
country fundamentals, with financial globalization eventu-
ally amplifying the vulnerability from the Russian Federa-
tion’s combination of a fixed exchange rate and unsustain-
able  government  debt  dynamics.  In  particular,  external
portfolio investors—motivated by the expectation of a big
official bailout—continued to finance the government’s debt
build-up after mid-May 1998, even though it was obvious
by then that a fundamentals-based crisis à la Krugman-
Flood-Garber (Krugman 1979; Flood and Garber 1984) and
Sargent-Wallace (1981) was unavoidable. As a result, Russia
ended up with a much bigger external debt burden when
the crisis eventually hit that August.
By February 1998, Russia had both achieved single-digit
inflation and substantially completed its privatization pro-
gram. Yet it endured a massive exchange rate/banking/public
debt crisis just six months later, in August 1998. This melt-
down, which we shall refer to as “Russia 1998,” was proba-
bly the most serious emerging market crisis witnessed over
the 1997–2001 time frame, a turbulent period bookended
by the crisis in East Asia and those in Argentina and Turkey.
Russia 1998 threatened to bring down the U.S. financial sys-
tem via the hedge fund managed by Long-Term Capital
Management. That threat prompted the New York Federal
Reserve to persuade 14 banks to pump $3.6 billion into the
fund while the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors aggres-
sively eased monetary policy by cutting interest rates thrice
in quick succession (see Dungey et al. [2006]). 
Although the contagion effects of Russia 1998 have been
studied extensively (in Dungey et al. [2006], for example),
the country crisis itself has received scant attention—with
Russia probably seen as too oil driven and geopolitical to
have broad appeal. However, lessons on financial globaliza-
tion from Russia 1998 are of general applicability. Indeed,
paying more attention to Russia might have had a beneficial
impact on the design of the rescue package for Argentina in
2001.1
Country Fundamentals 
Russia was going through two transitions: one from more than
70 years of central planning to a market economy; the other
from triple- to single-digit inflation and considerably lower fis-
In 1998, the Russian Federation experienced one of the most severe emerging market crises of the 1997–2001
period. It occurred less than six months after the attainment of single-digit inflation, which was supposed to launch
the economy onto a sustainable growth path. This note sets out why that occurred and discusses the lessons learned. cal deficits, a quest that began in earnest as part of a three-year
stabilization program launched with International Monetary
Fund (IMF) support in July 1995.2 But even though inflation
came down rapidly, the fiscal deficit targets were significantly
exceeded. As a result, even though the nominal exchange rate
was fixed (or managed with narrow bounds) to lower infla-
tion, interest rates on ruble Treasury bills (GKOs) stayed at
exceptionally high levels, averaging 56 percent in real terms
between May 1995 and July 1997. The real effective ex-
change rate appreciated some 55 percent over the same peri-
od, a more or less inevitable arithmetical consequence of the
exchange rate–based stabilization: the exchange rate was
fixed, but inflation came down only gradually (a point made
earlier by Dornbusch and Werner [1994]). 
The persistently high real interest rates and large real ap-
preciation made it all but impossible for enterprise man-
agers to operate profitably. At the same time, privatization
did not yield the improvements in corporate governance
and productivity one might have expected. The process was
marred, resulting either in control going to insiders as part
of mass privatization; or valuable companies in oil, metals,
and telecommunications going to the powerful Moscow
banks as part of the opaque “loans-for-shares” auctions car-
ried out in late-1995. 
Why did the adverse economic outcomes not prompt a
mid-course correction? For two reasons, in our assessment:
First, there was a deeply entrenched belief that lowering in-
flation would lead to fast, sustainable growth—and inflation
was coming down quickly.3 Second, the debt dynamics of the
government seemed under control. Table 1 shows that despite
significant primary fiscal deficits, high interest payments, and
small or negative growth rates, the debt-to-GDP ratio re-
mained more or less constant over the period 1995–97. Based
on standard debt dynamics, one would have expected the
debt-to-GDP ratio to have been on an explosive path.4
The explanation for the constancy of the debt-to-GDP
ratio is to be found in the real appreciation of the ruble: for
example, in 1996, the dollar-denominated share of govern-
ment debt was about 70 percent, and the dollar-ruble real
exchange rate appreciated by some 22 percent. That alone
would have reduced the debt-to-GDP ratio by some 8 per-
centage points and would have served to offset the impact
of high fiscal deficits and disappointing growth.
In addition to the inhospitable macroeconomic environ-
ment and weak corporate governance, a free-for-all atmos-
phere developed as widespread barter, noncash settlements,
and arrears of all types (“nonpayments”) took hold. Ironical-
ly, the government itself became a prime instigator of non-
payments, resorting to giving various forms of quasi-monies
and IOUs to its suppliers to economize on the use of cash
because of the astronomically high real interest rates (Pinto,
Drebentsov, and Morozov 2000; Commander and Mumssen
1998). The private sector retaliated by becoming delin-
quent on tax payments; and that culminated in elaborate
offset schemes whereby tax arrears were settled, in effect,
at a hefty discount. Nonpayments thus turned into a web of
hidden subsidies. Added to explicit budgetary subsidies, to-
tal subsidies were estimated at 15–20 percent of GDP in
1996 and 1997, leading to ingenious forms of asset stripping
instead of enterprise restructuring, and contributing directly
(if opaquely) to the fiscal crisis via the need for increased
debt issuance as taxes fell short. 
Financial Globalization
The liberalization of foreign portfolio investment in early
1997 swelled reserves to record levels of $25 billion by
midyear and pushed the stock market to new highs, while
interest rates on GKOs came down. That situation coincided
with falling inflation, which ignited hopes that growth was
about to take off. In addition, political certainty was firming,
with Boris Yeltsin’s reelection and the appointment of an
economic “dream team” consisting of high-profile reformers.
But, by that time, nonpayments had become deeply en-
trenched, with cash tax shortfalls a chronic problem. The
East Asian crisis spilled over in October 1997, leading to the
first of a series of speculative attacks on the ruble. That No-
vember, the central bank spent $6 billion (out of its reserves
of $23 billion) defending the ruble’s peg to the dollar; but,
eventually, it was forced to raise interest rates. 
The final attack on the ruble began in mid-May 1998. By
then, with single-digit inflation having been attained and
the real exchange rate holding steady, the government’s
debt dynamics were visibly unsustainable. Instead of aban-
doning the peg, however, Russia decided to mount a last de-
fense with the help of a $22.6 billion international rescue
package, led by the IMF and including the World Bank and
the government of Japan, that was announced in mid-July. 
Advised by Wall Street, the government also dabbled in
financial engineering, deciding to swap its short-term, costly
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Source: Pinto, Gurvich, and Ulatov 2005, table 9.1. 
a. Domestic plus foreign, end of period.
b. Does not capture the subsequent debt renegotiation.
Table 1. Public Finances and Economic Growth, 1995–98
Primary Real GDP
deﬁcit
Interest payments Government debta
growth
(percent Percent  Percent of US$  Percent (precent
Year of GDP) of GDP revenues  billions of GDP annually)
1995 2.2 3.6 28 170 50 –4.0
1996 2.5 5.9 47 201 48 –3.4
1997 2.4 4.6 38 218 50 0.9
1998b 1.3 4.6 43 242 75 –4.9GKOs for long-term, Eurobonds yielding 12–15 percent a
year. The logic was seemingly unimpeachable: the swap
would start a virtuous cycle by lowering interest payments
and rollover risk. That, plus the rescue package, would raise
market confidence and buy time for the government to
raise primary fiscal surpluses and at last resolve the non-
payments problem that was finally recognized as a crip-
pling  impediment  to  revenue  mobilization  and  faster
growth.
Ironically, the economic and financial situation unraveled
soon after the swap was completed. Less than four weeks
later, Russia abandoned the ruble peg and defaulted on a
substantial portion of its ruble-denominated debt on August
17, 1998, plunging its banks (which were heavily exposed
to sovereign debt) into a crisis as well. Including the GKO-
Eurobond swap, the government’s dollar-denominated debt
increased by more than $16 billion between June 1 and the
meltdown (in excess of 8 percent of postcrisis GDP). Para-
doxically, the amounts lent to Russia grew as the fundamen-
tals worsened and even as market investors themselves were
signaling exceptionally high levels of default and devalua-
tion risk. Table 2 shows how the risk premia demanded by
the market evolved after mid-May. 
Lessons
The behavior of the private investors shows that moral haz-
ard is alive and well, and sheds light on the “allocation puz-
zle.” Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007) argue that not only does
capital tend to flow from developing to developed countries,
in line with the Lucas paradox; but within developing coun-
tries, poorer performers (in terms of growth and productiv-
ity) receive the bulk of the capital flows—contrary to the
predictions of the neoclassical growth model. But Russia
1998 shows that if investors care only about short-term
gains and are driven by moral hazard, one is likely to see cap-
ital flows in line with what might appear to be an allocation
puzzle. That is the only reason one can offer to explain why
Russia was able to increase its external debt so significantly
after mid-May 1998, when it became crystal clear that the
fiscal situation was unsustainable. Investors clearly wanted
to have their cake (charge interest rates reflecting high de-
fault and devaluation risks) and eat it (exit with 100 percent
of ruble proceeds at the precrisis exchange rate when a large
official bailout package arrived). 
Instead of averting a crisis when fiscal fundamentals are
weak, financial engineering actually may trigger a crisis, as
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Date and event yield premium  premium
May 15: Fiscal sustainability clearly in question. 39.3 4.8 23.0
July 13: Announcement is made of IMF-led $22.6 billion rescue package and GKO-Eurobond swap.  102.3 8.5 82.3
July 14: (day following rescue announcement)  58.2 8.1 38.6
July 20: IMF board approves package. Disbursement is reduced from $5.6 billion to $4.8 billion as  51.6 7.8 32.3
parliament stalls on key expenditure control and tax measures.
July 23 (day preceding GKO-Eurobond swap completion) 54.2 8.2 34.4
July 24: GKO-Eurobond swap completed. GKO yields return to “crisis”‘ levels of mid-June,  66.4 10.0 44.9
sovereign risk premium jumps.
August 6: World Bank board approves crisis package–related loan, and disburses $300 million.  77.7 12.0 54.1
August 10 (Monday, one week before the meltdown) 99.0 20.0 67.5
August 14 (Friday preceding meltdown): $1.7 billion in reserves is lost as portfolio investors exit,  144.9 23.8 109.5
bringing total loss from July 10 to August 14 to $4.5 billion. Russia’s central bank bails 
out SBS-Agro bank with a $100 million loan.
August 17 (meltdown Monday): Devaluation and default. 
Source: Pinto and Ulatov forthcoming, table 4.
Note: If the yield on the one-year U.S. Treasury bill is 5 percent and the ruble/dollar target rate of depreciation is 6 percent, then the one-year GKO yield
should be 11 percent (based on interest parity). If the yield is higher, the excess is the sum of the sovereign (default) risk premium and the devaluation risk
premium (or the compensation for depreciation greater than the target of 6 percent). The sovereign risk premium was proxied by the spread on a short-
maturity Russian government dollar borrowing, relative to the U.S. government; and the devaluation risk premium then was obtained as a residual. See
Frankel and MacArthur (1988), who first used such a decomposition; and Pinto and Ulatov (forthcoming).shown by the GKO-Eurobond swap. By its nature, a market-
based, voluntary swap cannot be expected to lower the pres-
ent value of the government’s debt obligations, along the
lines of the Modigliani-Miller theorem. But a swap may
backfire and precipitate a crisis when fiscal solvency prob-
lems are present, as in Russia 1998. If the present value of
future primary surpluses is less than outstanding debt, one
way for the government to restore intertemporal budget bal-
ance is to let the nominal exchange rate depreciate—thereby
lowering the real value of its domestic currency obligations.
When a swap out of local currency debt into dollar-denom-
inated debt occurs, however, it lowers the outstanding stock
of domestic currency obligations (the tax base), calling for
an even larger depreciation (the tax rate).5 This recognition
could spur a speculative attack on foreign exchange reserves,
triggering a crisis. Financial engineering definitely is not a
free lunch, and the hidden tab may be surprisingly high!
Similarly, implementing a successful official bailout is ex-
tremely hard when fiscal solvency problems are present. In
Russia’s case, the liquidity injection to reserves financed by
implicitly senior debt from the rescue package would demote
the claims of GKO holders and become the perfect time to
exit, with the liquidity injection providing the means of es-
cape. Together with the GKO-Eurobond swap, the interna-
tional rescue package itself helped trigger the 1998 crisis.
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Notes
1. More generally, Russia 1998 demonstrates the perils in
official bailouts when fiscal fundamentals are weak (illustrat-
ed in 2010 by Greece). On June 8, 2010, when the European
Union put finishing touches on a €440 billion package to
help Greece and curb contagion, the 10-year Greek/German
sovereign bond yield spread was 560 basis points. On Octo-
ber 11, 2010, it was much higher: 700 basis points! 
2. This section is based on Kharas, Pinto, and Ulatov
(2001); and Pinto and Ulatov (forthcoming). 
3. The then first deputy managing director of the IMF,
Stanley Fischer, was quoted as follows in the final report of
the January 9–12, 1997, U.S.–Russian Investment Sympo-
sium  held  at  Harvard  University:  “Russia,  he  said,  has
achieved macroeconomic stabilization....The IMF is virtu-
ally certain, he declared, that real growth is underestimated
and will soon show up in official figures...” (p. 3).
4. Neither privatization proceeds nor seigniorage explains
the constancy of debt-to-GDP over the 1995–97 time frame.
As shown in table 1, there was a sizable increase in nominal
debt—some $50 billion—between 1995 and 1997.
5. A formal analytical statement of this argument can be
found in Aizenman, Kletzer, and Pinto (2005). For more on
the Russian swap and why it failed, see Pinto and Ulatov
(forthcoming).
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